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As 2004 marks the 12 5th anniversary of women's admission to the Supreme Court bar, this is
a fitting occasion to reflect on women's experiences and achievements before the Court. Given
that this is a history piece, this paper will focus principally on the first 100 years of women's
advocacy before the Court, from 1879 to 1979.1 In this 100-year period, women's membership
in the Supreme Court bar grew from two or one or no women per year between 1879 and 1900
(at a time when men were joining at the rate of 250 to 350 per year)2 to over 5 percent of
new admittees by 1979. Today, women constitute 25 percent of the roughly 4,500 to 5,000 new
admittees each year,3 but only 8 percent of the bar overall.
What you find in broad brushstroke in
studying the history of women's advocacy be-
fore the Court is that, in the first several
decades, women advocates were drawn prin-
cipally from solo and small practices-typical
of most attorneys of their day-and were not
litigating women's rights claims before the
Court. In the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, women advocates were drawn principally
from government agencies at the local, state,
and national evels, and, again, with few excep-
tions, were not litigating women's rights claims
before the Court. In the 1960s and 1970s, a
growing number of women advocates were af-
filiated with civil-rights advocacy groups, ex-
plicitly involved in litigating sex- and race-
discrimination cases before the Court. Finally,
in the last twenty-five years, women advocates
before the Court have been affiliated in roughly
equal measure with government agencies, non-
profit advocacy groups, and law-school fac-
ulties. Women presenting argument as mem-
bers ofthe leading law firms remain extremely
rare.4
After highlighting some of the most no-
table women advocates of the last century, I
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Myra Bradwell was a successful Chicago entrepreneur
who made a fortune publishing legal texts. Trained as
a lawyer, she was refused admittance to the Illinois
bar because of her sex. The Supreme Court upheld
the state bar's refusal in 1873, but women were able
to join most state bars by the end of the century.
conclude with thoughts on why it matters that
women have appeared, and continue to appear,
before the Court.
II. Women's Initial Entry Into
the Legal Profession
Women first entered the legal profession in the
United States immediately following the con-
clusion of the Civil War. Their numbers grew
modestly but steadily through the turn of the
century, despite the Supreme Court's 1873 de-
cision in Bradwell v. Illinois,6 which rejected
Myra Bradwell's claim that Illinois had vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges
and Immunities Clause when it refused her
admission to its bar on the grounds of sex.
In concurring in the judgment in Bradwell,
Justice Bradley now famously (or infamously)
declared:
Man is, or should be, woman's pro-
tector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which
belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations
of civil life.
Ultimately, he concluded:
The paramount destiny and mission
of woman are to fulfill the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother.
This is the law of the Creator.7
Even with the holding and rhetoric of Brad-
well, women succeeded injoining most states'
bars in the latter part of the nineteenth century,
such that by 1900, there were one thousand
women lawyers in the United States.
An increasing number of law schools be-
gan to admit women at this time,8 with women
seeking-and gaining-access on the grounds
that they were equal in their abilities to men and
should therefore learn the law alongside men.
By contrast, women gained admission to med-
ical schools on the ground that women's inher-
ently nurturing natures suited them especially
well for the care of women and children, with
many aspiring doctors attending all-women's
medical schools.9 Largely because of the dif-
ferent ideologies shaping women's entry into
the two professions, there were seven times as
many women doctors as lawyers at the start of
the twentieth century. 10
III. Women First Admitted
to the Supreme Court Bar
Belva Lockwood (1830-1917) had been a
member of the District of Columbia bar for
three years when she first applied for member-
ship in the Supreme Court bar in 1876. At that
time, as now, an applicant for the Court's bar
was required to "demonstrate a minimum of
three years' membership in good standing in
the bar of her state's highest court, and to have
her application sponsored by a current mem-
ber of the Supreme Court bar. If her applica-
tion was approved, admission [was] ... moved
and granted in open court. It was not until the
1970s that applications for admission to the
Supreme Court bar [could be] processed by
48
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Belva Lockwood lobbied Congress hard to petition for
women to be admitted to the Supreme Court bar.
Part of her strategy included addressing Senators
she didn't know "as though they were old familiar
friends."
mail." 1 Once admitted, attorneys could file
briefs and present argument, but most, then as
now, joined the bar principally for its symbolic
value.
Chief Justice Morrison Waite authored the
order denying Lockwood's application, which
declared:
By the uniform practice of the court,
from its organization to the present
time ... none but men are admitted
to practise [sic] before it as attor-
neys and counsellors. This is in ac-
cordance with immemorial usage in
England, and the law and practice in
all the States until within a recent
period ... . 12
Not easily defeated, Lockwood lobbied
Congress to amend the Court's bar admis-
sion rules to include women. Her petition to
Congress read as follows:
[Y]our petitioner has been debarred
from admission ... on the ground that
she is a woman, and that fact has
been largely published over the coun-
try much to the detriment of her law
practice upon which your petitioner
and her family are dependant [sic] for
support.
Wherefore your petitioner prays
your Honorable Body for the passage
of an Act enabling her or any other
woman similarly situated to be admit-
ted to the said ... Court on the same
terms as men .. 13
Lockwood proved to be a tenacious lobbyist.
"Nothing was too daring for me to attempt,"
she later confessed. Among other things, she
addressed senators she didn't know "as though
they were old familiar friends."14
After three years of Lockwood's lobbying,
Congress enacted an "Act to Relieve Certain
Legal Disabilities of Women," providing for
women's membership in the Supreme Court
bar.15 Successfully reapplying for admission
in 1879, Lockwood became the first woman
to join the Court's bar. Albert Riddle, a white
professor at Howard Law School, moved her
application. 16 A year later, Lockwood moved
the admission of Samuel Lowery of Huntsville,
Alabama, the first Southern black to be admit-
ted to the Court's bar.17
Once the Court's doors were pried open,
women began to sponsor one another's mem-
bership in the bar as a type of old-girls' net-
work. The movants included the Pier family of
lawyers-a mother and three daughters-who
were without peer in sponsoring one another's
Supreme Court barmembership inthe 1890s.18
"These [earliest women] members were well
known to one another. They worked together
in the woman suffrage movement ... and cor-
responded with one another about personal and
professional issues."19 Addressing one another
as "Sisters in Law," they grappled with issues
of what to call themselves-"Lady Lawyers"
or just plain "Lawyers," of how to manage
competing demands of work and family, and
even of what to wear as professional women.
Whether to wear one's hat in court was an is-
sue of no small concern for the earliest women
49
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FRANK LSI 'S ILLUSTRATED NEWSPAPERL
A year after she herself was permitted to become a member of the Supreme Court bar in 1879, Lockwood
(left) moved the admission of Samuel Lowry of Huntsville, Alabama. Lowry (second from left) became the first
Southern black admitted to the Supreme Court bar.
lawyers. A well-dressed, modest woman ofthat
day wore a hat whenever in public. At the same
time, a lawyer was expected to take his hat off
in court. Demands of modesty prevailed over
those of professional custom, and women's
hats remained on in court.
Despite what I would now call a widely
held "feminist consciousness" among these
first women (though the term "feminist" was
first used only decades later),20 only one of
the first women Supreme Court bar mem-
bers litigated a women's rights claim before
the Court.21 This again was Lockwood, who
brought an original action in the Court on be-
half of herself and all other similarly situated
women who were denied membership in the
Virginia state bar on the ground of sex.
By contrast, the handful of earliest women
members who actually appeared before the
Court did so in disputes concerning wills,
property, and contracts, typical of the solo or
small law offices in which they practiced. And,
given men's greater participation in business
and property holding at this time, it is not sur-
prising to learn that these women advocates
represented male clients more often than they
did female.
IV. Belva Lockwood, the First
Woman to Argue Before the Court
Belva Lockwood was the first woman to ar-
gue before the Supreme Court,22 doing so in
1880, the year following her admission to the
bar. There, in the case of Kaiser v. Stickney,23
Lockwood sought to use married women's
legally disadvantaged status to benefit her
clients, a married couple who sought to dis-
avow the wife's transfer of property to a third
party.24 Though Lockwood opposed restric-
tions on married women's property rights as
a matter of principle, she nevertheless invoked
so0
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traditional understandings of the limited nature
of married women's dominion over property in
pressing her clients' case. The Court rejected
Lockwood's argument on factual grounds,
finding that the property transfer was valid be-
cause it had been executed by both husband
and wife. 25
After running for President on the Equal
Rights party ticket in the 1880s, Lockwood
petitioned the Supreme Court in 1894 to di-
rect the state of Virginia to admit her to its
bar, from which she had been excluded on the
basis of sex. In relying on Bradwell to reject
Lockwood's petition, the Court concluded
that Virginia had not violated the Four-
teenth Amendment's Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause by interpreting the word "persons"
to mean "male," and not "male andfemale per-
sons," in defining who was eligible for its bar.26
Lockwood's next, last, and most fa-
mous argument was on behalf of the Eastern
Cherokee Indian Nation, heard for two days in
1906.27 There, "the Supreme Court affirmed [a
lower court] judgment, awarding over a million
dollars with interest against the United States"
as reparations for its forced relocation of the
Cherokees.28
V. Highlights of Some of the Most
Notable Women to Appear Before
the Court in the Century
Following Lockwood
In the first decades of the twentieth century,
when there was one woman attorney for every
5,000 to 10,000 lawyers in the United States,
a couple of dozen women filed certiorari pe-
titions and/or merits briefs in the Supreme
Court, mostly appearing on behalf of local,
state, or federal governments. As with the ear-
liest women advocates, essentially no one in
this second wave litigated cases directly fram-
ing women's rights issues before the Court.29
Annette Abbott Adams (1877-1956)
Annette Abbott Adams graduated from Boalt
Hall Law School in 1912, the only woman in
her class. Thereafter, Adams trained with a
voice instructor to lower her voice in order
to promote her career prospects.3 0 In 1914,
she appeared at trial against John Preston,
the U.S. attorney for the Northern District of
California. Adams is said to have so impressed
Preston that he hired her as one of his assistant
U.S. attorneys, making her the first woman to
serve in that position. When Preston was called
to Washington to serve as assistant attorney
general in 1918, Adams was named to fill his
vacancy as U.S. attorney, the first woman to
hold that post and the only one to do so until
the Carter administration.
In 1920, Adams herself was called to
Washington to serve as an assistant attorney
general, where her primary responsibility was
enforcing Prohibition. She was again the first
woman to hold this office. Adams was named
to this post shortly after the 1919 ratification
of the Eighteenth Amendment,31 prohibiting
commerce in liquor, and the 1920 ratification
of the Nineteenth Amendment, guaranteeing
women the right to vote. Some ascribe the
President's choice of Adams to an effort to
"woo" the new women voters (and thus an early
manifestation of concern for the gender gap in
voting).32
Though she was in office for slightly un-
der a year, Adams argued five Supreme Court
cases, losing only one. Three of the cases in-
volved Prohibition, one railroad safety, and
the other tax forfeitures. In each case, Adams




Earning the moniker "Prohibition Portia,"
Mabel Walker Willebrandt oversaw the fed-
eral government's enforcement of Prohibition,
along with tax and insurance-law matters, as
Adams' successor between 1921 and 1929. In
interviewing Willebrandt for this post, Presi-
dent Warren Harding noted that he only thing
against her was her age (32), a condition,
s1
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As an assistant attorney general in the 1920s, Mabel Willebrandt gained national fame for vigorously enforcing
the Prohibition Act. She argued frequently before the Supreme Court but struggled during oral arguments to
understand the Justices, as she was losing her hearing.
Willebrandt assured him, that would go away
with time.34
Willebrandt participated in more than 270
cases at the certiorari stage35 and twenty-two
cases at the merits stage during her eight years
with the Justice Department, presenting oral
argument in at least ten cases, including four
that were argued in the same month.36 In each
case, Willebrandt was the only woman to ap-
pear on brief or at argument.
The vast majority of cases in which
Willebrandt participated related to Prohibition.
While Willebrandt, like Adams, had not been
a prohibitionist before coming to Washington,
she "was determined to uphold the law"37 once
in office. Among her Supreme Court cases was
one defending against a challenge to the Prohi-
bition Act as unconstitutionally discriminating
between malt liquor and "spiritous and vinu-
ous liquors" by allowing doctors to continue
prescribing wine and spirits for medicinal pur-
poses, but not beer.38 The Court ruled with the
government in that case.
The Associated Press called Willebrandt
"the most famous woman attorney during the
first halfofthe twentieth century."39 One ofher
biographers went even further, calling Wille-
brandt the most famous American woman of
her time.40 In eulogizing her, Willebrandt's
friend and former law partner, Judge John
Sirica, declared, "'If Mabel had worn trousers,
she could have been President."'4 1
Nevertheless, Willebrandt's time in office
was a difficult one, for, among other things,
she was losing her hearing.42 In writing to her
mother the night before arguing a case in the
1923 Term, Willebrandt confessed, "Each time
it's such a struggle not to be terrified over my
ears. [The Justices] talk so low." 43
Though Willebrandt actively campaigned
for Hoover in 1928, she was forced out of of-
fice following his 1929 inauguration-some
52
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Susan Brandeis (right) is
the only daughter of a sit-
ting Justice to have argued
before the Court. Justice
Brandeis recused himself
from argument and deci-
sion in the 1925 case
and urged his daughter
to "raise [her] professional
performance as high as
[her] abilities and hard
work would make possi-
ble."
say because she was too outspoken a fig-
ure in enforcing Prohibition.t Willebrandt's
hoped-for federal judgeship, as reward for her
government service, was dashed on the same
shores.45
Susan Brandeis (1893-1975)
To date, the only daughter of a sitting Jus-
tice to argue before the Court46 is Susan
Brandeis, daughter of Associate Justice Louis
Brandeis.47 Justice Brandeis recused himself
from argument and decision in the 1925 case of
Margolin v. United States,48 involving a chal-
lenge to a federal statute prohibiting attorneys
from charging more than $3 for work in prepar-
ing a veteran's benefits claim.
The novelty of Brandeis' argument won
front-page attention in the New York Times,
which announced, "Brandeis's Daughter in
Supreme Court Today to Argue New York
War Insurance Fee Case."49 As Frank Gilbert,
son of Susan Brandeis, recounts, after the
argument:
Grandfather [Justice Brandeis] wrote
mother [Advocate Brandeis] who was
then thirty-two:
"You are certainly getting fine pub-
licity and fruits will come later if you
will raise your professional perfor-
mance as high as your abilities and
hard work would make possible.
Lovingly, Father."50
53
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A unanimous Court rejected Brandeis' argu-
ment and upheld the attorney-fee limitation.
1940s and 1950s
As with many fields of endeavor, women's op-
portunities in the legal profession expanded
during World War II, only to contract with
men's return from war and the postwar empha-
sis on stability, security, and domesticity. It was
during the war, for example, that the first fe-
male Supreme Court law clerk, Lucille Lomen,
was hired, by Justice William 0. Douglas in
1944. It would be another twenty-two years be-
fore the next woman law clerk was hired," and
another fifteen or so years beyond that before
there was anything resembling a critical mass
of women serving as Supreme Court clerks.
How the service of women law clerks affected
the Justices' receptivity to women advocates
can only be guessed,52 and becomes a factor
only at the very tail end of the period under
consideration here, if at all.53
Despite women's ervice on many fronts
during the war, the Court upheld a state law
prohibiting women from serving as bartenders
shortly after the war's conclusion. This was
the case of Goesaert v. Cleary,54 in which
a woman, Anne Davidow, argued on behalf
of the plaintiffs in the Supreme Court. In
its opinion rejecting the women's claims, the
Court made light of the idea of women tending
bar, replete with references to Shakespeare's
alewife.
Women pursuing legal careers in the post-
war era spoke of being out of step with the
dominant cultural expectations of the time-
for women to marry young, bear children, and
stay home. Indeed, as late as 1961, the Supreme
Court relied on an understanding of women as
the "center of home and family life" to uphold
a Florida law excluding women from service as
jurors unless they specially registered their in-
terest in advance.56 Gwendolyn Hoyt, who had
been convicted ofmurdering her husband by an
all-male jury, argued on appeal to the Court that
a jury that included some women might have
responded more sympathetically to her evi-
dence of ongoing abuse by her husband. Hoyt
was briefed by two women-Raya Dreben for
petitioner and Dorothy Kenyon for the ACLU
as amicus in support of petitioner51-but ar-
gued by men.
In spite of a postwar environment that dis-
couraged the interests and ambitions of profes-
sional women, a small number were active in
the Supreme Court at this time, two of whom
are highlighted below.
Bessie Margolin (1909-1996). As an attor-
ney with the Labor Department in the 1940s,
1950s, and 1960s, Bessie Margolin "rose to be-
come assistant solicitor in charge of Supreme
Court litigation" and associate solicitor for Fair
Labor Standards.5 8 Margolin participated in
dozens of Supreme Court cases while at the
Labor Department,'5 9 where she was the ex-
pert on the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
the federal law regulating wages and hours of
work,60 and most of her Court arguments in-
volved interpreting the FLSA.61
Unlike Adams and Willebrandt, who were
the only women on either side of their cases,
Margolin was accompanied on brief by other
women attorneys with the Labor Depart-
ment.62 As with Adams and Willebrandt, how-
ever, Margolin's cases by and large did not
present women's rights issues. In reflecting
on Margolin's ability as an advocate, Justice
William 0. Douglas observed, "She was crisp
in her speech and penetrating in her analyses,
reducing complex factual situations to simple,
orderly problems."63
Beatrice Rosenberg (1908-1989). Appearing
at approximately the same time as Margolin,
Beatrice Rosenberg is said to hold the women's
record for presenting argument in the Court-
thirty cases in as many years.64 By contrast, the
record for men in the twentieth century "be-
longs to Deputy Solicitor General Lawrence
Wallace, who has argued more than 150 cases"
in the Supreme Court.65
54
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A career attorney with the Justice Depart-
ment's Criminal Division between 1943 and
1972, Rosenberg rose through the ranks to the
position of chief of criminal appeals, where
she was recognized for her expertise on search-
and-seizure law.66 Among the cases Rosenberg
participated in before the Court were Abbott
Labs v. Gardner,67 holding pre-enforcement
review of regulations issued by the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare not prohib-
ited by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act;
and Welsh v. United States,68 reversing Welsh's
conviction for draft evasion on the grounds that
his nontheistic conscientious objection was
held with "the strength of more traditional re-
ligious convictions."
One colleague described Rosenberg's oral
advocacy style as spellbinding, "[She] was a
very powerful woman ... I was awe-struck by
[her]." 69 Justice Douglas, in The Court Years,
included Rosenberg on a short list of Justice
Department attorneys who, in his estimation,
"made more enduring contributions to the art
of advocacy before us than most of the 'big-
name' lawyers."70
Women Appointed to Represent Pro Se Par-
ties in the Supreme Court. During the period
in which Margolin and Rosenberg were ap-
pearing regularly, the Court appointed its first
woman to represent the interests of a pro se
party before it. 7 1 This was Helen Washington,
a tax attorney at the Justice Department, who
was appointed in 1959.72 Dean Acheson, con-
sidered to be the first man to serve in this ca-
pacity, had been named more than twenty-five
years earlier.73
1960s and 1970s
Two of the most prominent Supreme Court ad-
vocates of all time appeared on behalf of civil
rights advocacy groups in the 1960s and 1970s:
Constance Baker Motley, of the National As-
sociation for the Advancement of Colored Peo-
ple (NAACP) Legal Defense Fund (LDF);
and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, of the
American Civil Liberties Union's (ACLU)
Women's Rights Project.
Constance Baker Motley (1921-present).
Constance Baker Motley argued ten race-
discrimination cases before the Court in the
early 1960s, winning nine of them.74 The one
case she lost was subsequently overturned.
This was the case of Swain v. Alabama,7 5 up-
holding the use of race-based peremptory chal-
lenges injury selection, which the Court would
later reject in Batson v. Kentucky.76
Having joined the Inc. Fund immedi-
ately after graduating from Columbia Law
School, in 1946, Motley participated in the
Supreme Court briefing of all of the ma-
jor race-discrimination cases of her time.7 7
When Thurgood Marshall left the Inc. Fund
for a federal appellate judgeship in 196 1,78
Motley and colleague Jack Greenberg took
over the LDF's Supreme Court arguments.7 9
The cases in which Motley argued fell into
three broad categories: sit-ins, criminal proce-
dure, and desegregation of public services.8 0
Motley argued a total of five sit-in cases be-
fore the Court, prevailing in each of them,
despite having to argue two on one day in
the fall of 196281 and two on another day in
the fall of 1963.82 Back-to-back argumenta-
tion was nothing new for Motley, who once ar-
gued four appeals on the same day in the Fifth
Circuit.83
During Motley's argument in Hamilton
v. Alabama,84 establishing the right to coun-
sel at arraignment in capital cases, Motley
observed, "[Justice] Douglas seemed to pay
no attention. He appeared to be writing let-
ters and doing other work, as usual." "Appar-
ently [he] was paying attention," she later rec-
ognized, because he wrote the opinion for a
unanimous Court reversing Hamilton's con-
viction. Indeed, Douglas "place[d] [Motley]
in the top ten of any group of advocates at
the appellate level in this country,"85 com-
paring her to Charles Hamilton Houston, "the
highest compliment I have ever received," said
Motley.86
ss
JOURNAL OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People lawyer Constance Baker Motley was pho-
tographed in 1962 when she and her colleague Jack Greenberg (right) represented James Meredith (cen-
ter) in his segregation case against the University of Mississippi. Motley worked with Thurgood Marshall
on Brown v Board of Education and other landmark litigation that desegregated schools and Southern
universities.
When President Johnson i vited Motley
to the White House to announce his intention
of naming her to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York in 1966, thus
making her the first African American woman
nominated for a federal judgeship, Johnson
told Motley that Attorney General Ramsey
Clark "was the first person to bring [Motley]
to his attention," doing so on the strength of
her Supreme Court arguments.8 7
Ruth Bader Ginsburg (1933-present). It goes
almost without saying that Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg briefed and argued the leading
women's rights cases of the 1970s as co-
founding director of the ACLU's Women's
Rights Project.88 The rulings that resulted
from the Project's litigation campaign repre-
sented no less than a revolution in women's le-
gal status, overturning a century of Supreme
Court precedent that had tolerated-indeed,
embraced-differential treatment of women
and men.89
When the Project was formed in 1972,90
Ginsburg had just recently joined Columbia
Law School as its first tenured female fac-
ulty member and had worked out an arrange-
ment whereby she could devote half her time
to the Project. In many ways, Ginsburg and
the Project followed the step-by-step approach
modeled by Marshall, Motley, and the NAACP
LDF in their pathbreaking litigation for racial
justice. The Project's litigation agenda was
grounded in formal equality principles, main-
taining that similarly situated men and women
should be treated the same under the law. This
may seem an unsurprising principle now, but
it was by no means widely accepted at that
56
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time. In looking back on this period, Ginsburg
has observed, "In one sense, our mission in
the 1970s was easy: the targets were well de-
fined. There was nothing subtle about he way
things were. Statute books in the States and
Nation were riddled with what we then called
sex-based differentials."91
While Ginsburg defined the mission as
"easy" in one sense, one of the biggest chal-
lenges she and the Project faced was how to
persuade the Court that sex-based differentials,
long viewed as benign and even beneficial to
women, were instead deeply harmful-to men
as well as women. Ginsburg later noted:
Our mission was to educate ...
decisionmakers in the nation's legis-
latures and courts. We tried to convey
to them that something was wrong
with their perception of the world.
We sought to spark judges' and law-
makers' understanding that their own
daughters and granddaughters could
be disadvantaged by the way things
were.92
In furtherance of its equality goals, the
Project participated as party representative or
friend ofthe Court in a number of cases demon-
strating the ill effects of sex stereotyping on
men as well as women, as in the case of
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld.93 There, the Project
represented Stephen Wiesenfeld in his efforts
to obtain surviving spouse benefits to care
for his infant son, where his wife had died
in childbirth and the governing Social Secu-
rity Act provision extended benefits only to
surviving wives, on the compound assumption
that mothers-and not fathers-were involved
in the daily care of their children and that
fathers-and not mothers-were their fami-
lies' breadwinners.94 The Court adopted the
Project's argument that such distinctions vi-
olated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause and struck down the provision.
Between 1971 and 1979, Ginsburg filed
merits briefs on behalf of parties in a total of
nine cases, arguing six.96 In nearly all of the
cases, Melvin Wulf, the ACLU's legal direc-
tor, joined Ginsburg on the brief. Also joining
them on the briefs were a number of women
attorneys with the Project, including Brenda
Feigen Fasteau, Kathleen Peratis, and Susan
Deller Ross.97 In addition to its party repre-
sentation, the Project submitted amicus briefs
in fifteen other cases raising sex discrimina-
tion questions before the Court.98 Ginsberg did
all this while pressing for legislative reform,9 9
engaging in public education on the issues,100
teaching law at Columbia, co-authoring one
of the first casebooks on sex discrimination
law,101 and raising two children. Reflecting
on this period, Ginsburg exclaimed, "It was
wonderful, it was really exhilarating ... but we
were always tired."1 02
The impact of the Project's litigation cam-
paign cannot be overstated. In the words of for-
mer Boalt Hall Dean Herma Hill Kay:
Quite literally, it was [Ginsburg's]
voice, raised in oral argument and re-
flected in the drafting of briefs, that
shattered old stereotypes and opened
new opportunities for both sexes. She
built, and persuaded the Court to
adopt, a new constitutional frame-
work for analyzing the achievement
of equality for women and men. In do-
ing so, Ginsburg in large part created
the intellectual foundations of the
present law of sex discrimination.103
Following the Project's overwhelming success,
there was a significant rise in amicus participa-
tion in the Court by other women's rights advo-
cacy groups, including the National Organiza-
tion for Women, the Women's Legal Defense
Fund, and the National Women's Law Center.
Harriet Sturtevant Shapiro. (1928-pre-
sent)1 0' The history of women's first 100
years as Supreme Court advocates would not
be complete without highlighting the career of
the first woman member of the Solicitor Gen-
eral's Office, Harriet Shapiro, who was hired
by then-Solicitor General Erwin Griswold
57
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"It was really exhilarating... but we were always tired," recalled Justice Ginsburg (center) about her time
litigating at the Women's Rights Project in the 1970s. Her son James and nephew David (below with Ginsburg,
left to right) attended her 1979 argument in Duren v. Missouri challenging a law that allowed women-but
not men-to opt out of jury service to attend to their home and family.
in 1972. Over the course of the next twenty-
nine years with the Solicitor General's
Office,10 Shapiro briefed seventy-two cases
and argued seventeen,106 a record passed only
recently by Beth Brinkmann, who argued
nineteen cases for the Office between 1994
and 2001.107
Shapiro was not, however, the first woman
from the Solicitor General's Office to argue
before the Court. That distinction belongs to
Jewel LaFontant,108 a political appointee, who
preceded Shapiro in presenting argument in the
Court's 1972 Term.
I began this article by addressing the prob-
lem of the hat for early women lawyers, and
I would like to conclude by highlighting the
problem of the morning coat for women in the
Solicitor General's Office. The charcoal-gray
morning coat has been, and continues to be,
the standard uniform worn by male members
of the Solicitor General's Office when appear-
ing before the Court.109 What were women in
the Solicitor General's Office to do with this
uniform? Some custom-designed skirt suits re-
sembling morning coats, while others opted for
other somber-colored suits. The retention of
the morning-coat tradition marks women ad-
vocates as different from the norm, as "nonuni-
form," as had the hat of an earlier era.
VI. Why Does It Matter That Women
Have Served-and Continue to
Serve-as Supreme Court Advocates?
In considering the question of "why it mat-
ters" that women have served as advocates be-
fore the Court, I have developed a number of
hypotheses, which are neither mutually exclu-
sive nor exhaustive of potential explanations
for the significance of women's participation
in the Court.
1. Equality/nondiscrimination
This hypothesis suggests that women's par-
ticipation as Supreme Court advocates is
ss8
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important, regardless of its impact on case out-
comes, because we as a society value equality
of opportunity and freedom from discrimina-
tion in gaining access to professional experi-
ences of this nature.
2. Legitimacy/representativeness
This hypothesis posits that having women par-
ticipate in the Supreme Court process pro-
motes public trust and confidence that justice
will be served. Women's participation furthers
the perceived legitimacy ofthe judicial process
as a more inclusive and representative system.
3. Insider/outsider
Borrowing from the political-science litera-
ture, this hypothesis asserts hat it is important
to have "insiders" operating within the system
who can advocate "outsider" perspectives for
those who do not otherwise have access to or
influence over decisionmakers. This hypothe-
sis applies with particular force to advocacy
before the Supreme Court, where some repeat
players take on the mantle of "insiders," gain-
ing credibility in front of and trust from the
Justices, which they can then use to benefit
"outsiders"-who have historically included
women.
4. Educational/inspirational
This hypothesis recognizes that women's par-
ticipation at the highest levels of the pro-
fession is important for shattering stereo-
types and modeling possibilities of women's
achievements in the law for present and future
generations.
5. Difference
This hypothesis anticipates that different styles
of argumentation, ideology, and/or outcomes
can be associated with women's Supreme
Court advocacy. Whether premised on biol-
ogy, biography, or both, there is less evidence
of women modeling a different style of ad-
vocacy and more of women bringing a dif-
ferent set of issues to the table, changing the
agenda and thereby changing the shape of the
law through their participation. In this regard,
there has been a notable increase in the num-
ber of cases brought before the Court raising
concerns of particular interest to women as the
number ofwomen advocates has grown. I think
here of cases related to employment discrimi-
nation, violence against women, sexual harass-
ment, family-leave rights, affirmative action,
and gay rights, to name but a few.
In the end, arguing before the Supreme
Court connotes being the ultimate lawyer,
the ultimate gentleman, and even the ulti-
mate warrior, given that military references are
not infrequent in the Supreme Court practice
literature.1 10 The importance of advocacy in
this forum for making a mark on history can-
not be overestimated, where the greats have
shaped the law, as well as the public's and the
profession's understanding of what it means to
be a lawyer. In a profession inextricably linked
in the public's mind with authority, the exercise
of that authority by women at the highest level
is a powerfully symbolic act.
And in those cases in which women have
presented argument on issues ofparticular con-
cern to women, the effect of women's partici-
pation is that much more profound. No longer
must women ask men to plead their interests.
Instead, they are empowered to state their own
cases, and in so doing, further empower them-
selves.
*Special thanks to Dean Claudio Grossman for
supporting the research that enabled this talk,
and to my assistants, Erin Shute, Amy Jiron,
Christina Vitale, and Emily Gallas, for their
wonderful work.
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atis, who succeeded Justice Ginsburg as director of the
Women's Rights Project, Project attorney Susan Deller
Ross; Jane Picker of the Women's Law Fund in Cleveland;
Harriet Rabb of the New York City Corporation Coun-
sel's Office (and NYCLU board member, who left to start
an employment discrimination clinic at Columbia Law
School in 1971); Sarah Weddington of Texas; and Wendy
Williams of the California-based Equal Rights Advocates.
89
Before addressing the Women's Rights Project's
litigation directly, the author would like to recognize the
influence of Pauli Murray, an African-American lawyer,
political scientist, and Episcopalian minister, whose writ-
ings on the parallels between race and sex discrimination
shaped the thinking of a generation of students and schol-
ars, including Justice Ginsburg. See, e.g, Pauli Murray
and Mary 0. Eastwood, "Jane Crow and the Law: Sex
Discrimination and Title VII," 34 George Wash. L. Rev
232 (1965). Murray's influence also came through her
service on the ACLU Board, where, in the late 1960s,
she advocated pursuing an aggressive litigation campaign
against sex discrimination. Kerber, supra note 58, at 194-
95. (National Organization of Women founding member
Faith Seidenberg, an attorney from Syracuse, New York,
likewise advocated ACLU engagement on these issues at
this time, as did Barbara Preiskel, then general counsel of
the Motion Picture Association, and Catherine Roraback,
solo practitioner in New Haven, who worked with Yale
Law Professor Thomas I. Emerson on Griswold v Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).)
To honor Murray's leadership on sex discrimination
issues, Ginsburg named Murray-along with Dorothy
Kenyon, a leading civil-rights and women's-rights lawyer
and judge-on the first brief that she filed in a sex-
discrimination case in the Supreme Court. This was the
ACLU's brief for the appellant in Reed v Reed in the
Court's 1971 Term. Brief for Appellant in Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971). See also Kerber, supra note 58, at 199-204
("Neither Kenyon nor Murray had actually participated
in the writing of the brief, but Ginsburg was determined
to acknowledge the intellectual debt which contemporary
feminist legal argument owed to 'those brave women.' The
succession of names on the Reed brief was the sign of a
torch passed by one generation and aggressively claimed
by another.").
Thus, while Murray was not herself a Supreme Court
advocate, she played a critical role in the history of
women's Supreme Court advocacy. See, e.g, Serena
Mayeri, "Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the
Historical Dynamics of Change," 92 Calif L. Rev 755
(2004) (highlighting Murray's pragmatic approach to ad-
vocating expansion of women's legal status).
90A host of individuals have provided helpful accounts
of the formation of the Women's Rights Project, includ-
ing: Cowan, "Women's Rights Through Litigation," 8
Colum. Human RightsL. Rev 373; Cushman, ed., Supreme
Court Decisions and Women's Rights, supra note 50;
Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Women in Law 137-38 (2d
ed. 1993); Herma Hill Kay, "Celebration of the Tenth
Anniversary of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's Appoint-
ment to the Supreme Court of the United States: Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Professor of Law," 104 Colum. L. Rev 1,
12 (2004) (hereafter "Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Professor of
Law"); Kerber, supra note 58, at 199-204 (see also Linda
K. Kerber, "Sally Reed demands Equal Treatment," in
Days of Destiny 440 [James McPherson & Alan Brinkley,
eds. 2001]); O'Connor, Womens Organizations' Use of
the Courts, supra note 90, at 123-30; Wendy Williams,
"Sex Discrimination: Closing the Law's Gender Gap," in
The Burger Years: Rights and Wrongs in the Supreme
Court, 1969-86 109 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987); and,
of course, Justice Ginsburg herself. See, e.g., Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, "Comment on Reed v Reed," Women s Rights
Law Reporter 7 (1977); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "Com-
ment: Frontiero v Richardson," Women s Rights Law
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Reporter 2 (1973); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "Gender and
the Constitution," 44 U Cin. L. Rev. 1 (1975); Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, "Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and
1974 Terms," 1975 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1; Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
"Sex Equality and the Constitution," 52 Tul. L. Rev. 451
(1978); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "Sexual Equality Under the
Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments," 1979 Wash.
U L. Q. 161 (1979); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "Remarks for
the Celebration of 75 Years of Women's Enrollment at
Columbia Law School," 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1441 (2002)
(hereafter "Remarks for the Celebration").
91
Ginsburg, "Remarks for the Celebration," supra note 92,
at 1441.
92Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "Foreword to Symposium:
Women, Justice and Authority," 14 Yale IL. & Fem. 213,
214-15 (2002) (hereafter "Foreword to Symposium"). As
Justice Brennan characterized it in his opinion in Frontiero
v. Richardson, "Traditionally, such discrimination was ra-
tionalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism,' which,
in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in
a cage." 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). This pedestal/cage
metaphor was first used by California Supreme Court Jus-
tice Peters in the Sail'er Inn case. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby,
95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 341 (Cal. 1971).
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1n Weinberger v Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)
(Ginsburg briefed and argued as counsel for plaintiff ap-
peltee Wiesenfeld), the Court struck down certain sex-
based distinctions in the Social Security Act that provided
survivor benefits to wives and children in the case of work-
ing husbands' deaths, but only to the children-and not
to the husband-in the case of a working wife's death.
This, the Court held, violated the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause because it discriminated against female
wage-earners by providing them less protection for their
survivors than male wage-earners received and perpetu-
ated an archaic and overbroad generalization that women's
wages were not as vital to their families' support as were
men's wages.
94The Project followed a similar strategy in Craig v Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976), where the Project filed an amicus
brief challenging the constitutionality of a state law that
set a higher minimum drinking age for men than women
for 3.2 beer.
95The Women's Rights Project filed briefs on the merits
in the following cases:
Reed v Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971);
Struck v Secretary of Defense, cert. granted,
409 U.S. 947, judgment vacated, 409 U.S. 1071
(1972);
Frontiero v Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974);
Weinbergerv Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975);
Edwards v Healy, 421 U.S. 772 (1975);
Turner v Dep't ofEmployment Security, 423
U.S. 44 (1975);
Calfano v Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); and
Duren v Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
96
Justice Ginsburg presented argument on behalf of the
Women's Rights Project in the following cases:
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);
Kahn v Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974);
Weinbergerv. Wiesenfeld,420 U.S. 636(1975);
Edwards v. Healy, 421 U.S. 772 (1975);
Calfano v Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); and
Duren v Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
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See, e.g., Fasteau in Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 677 (Fasteau's
then husband, Marc Fasteau, also contributed importantly
to the Project's brief in Frontiero), and Ross in Los Angeles
Dept. ofWater andPower v Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978),
and Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 430 U.S.
703 (1977).
98The Women's Rights Project filed amicus briefs in the
following cases:
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973);
Cleveland Board ofEducation v La Fleur, 414
U.S. 632 (1972);
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188
(1974);
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974);
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v Wetzel, judg-
ment vacated for want ofan appealable order,
424 U.S. 737 (1976);
General Electric Co. v Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976);
Craig v Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
Coker v Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977);
Dothard v Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977);
Nashville Gas Co. v Satty, 434 U.S. 136
(1977);
Univ. of Calfornia Regents v Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978);
Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v Man-
hart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978);
Orr v Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979);
Calfano v Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); and
Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S.
142 (1980).
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Kerber, supra note 58, at 204. Three of the most signif-
icant cases on which Ginsburg worked during her time at
the Project:
1. Reed v Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (Ginsburg briefed).
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Ginsburg filed a brief for appellant in Reed v. Reed
in the summer of 1971 as a volunteer lawyer with the
ACLU, before the Women's Rights Project was formed.
Reed had been spotted by ACLU General Counsel Mar-
vin Karpatkin. See Epstein, supra note 92, at 137.
In Reed, a mother and father, by then divorced, each
petitioned to be named estate administrator for their
seventeen-year-old son, who had died of self-inflicted
gunshot wounds while on a custodial visit with his fa-
ther. The probate court judge appointed the father as
administrator despite the fact that the mother's appli-
cation had been filed first in time because Idaho law
provided that, "as between persons equally entitled to
administer a decedent's estate [such as a mother and fa-
ther], 'males must be preferred to females."' Ginsburg,
"Remarks for the Celebration," at 1444 (quoting Idaho
Code § 15-314).
Ginsburg framed the issue for decision in Reed as
whether the sex-based distinction contained in the Idaho
code "created a 'suspect classification' requiring close
judicial scrutiny." Brief for Appellant in Reed at 5. As
such, Ginsburg invited use of the strict-scrutiny stan-
dard of review, hitherto applied only to cases of fun-
damental rights, such as voting, and to classifications
based on race and national origin. Strict scrutiny re-
quires the government, in defending its law, to artic-
ulate a compelling justification and demonstrate that
the chosen means were narrowly tailored to serve the
governmental purpose.
Ginsburg analogized sex to race:
[I]t is presumptively impermissible to distin-
guish on the basis of an unalterable identifying
trait over which the individual has no control
and for which he or she should not be disad-
vantagedby the law. Legislative discrimination
grounded on sex, for purposes unrelated to any
biological difference between the sexes, ranks
with legislative discrimination based on race,
another congenital, unalterable trait of birth,
and merits no greater judicial deference.
Brief for Appellant in Reed, at 5. Ginsburg appended to
her Reed brief a compilation of sex-based differentials
then currently reflected in state and federal aw. Accord-
ing to Ginsburg, "Research for the brief and appendix
was supplied by law students from NYU, Rutgers, and
Yale." Ginsburg, "Foreword to Symposium," at 214.
Relying on this compendium, Ginsburg argued:
The distance to equal opportunity for women
in the United States remains considerable in
face of the pervasive social, cultural and legal
roots of sex-based discrimination.
Brief for Appellant in Reed at 6. Noting that the Court
itself was implicit in this discrimination, Ginsburg un-
derscored how far social norms had changed:
Prior decisions of this Court have contributed
to the separate and unequal status of women in
the United States.. . [But] .. . [i]n very recent
years, anew appreciation of women's place has
been generated in the United States. Activated
by feminists of both sexes, courts and legis-
latures have begun to recognize the claim of
women to fIll membership in the class "per-
sons" entitled to due process guarantees of life
and liberty and the equal protection of the laws.
Brief for Appellant in Reed at 5-6, 10.
In a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger, the Court struck down the Idaho
law as violative of the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause. This was the first time in history that
the Court struck down a law on the grounds of sex
discrimination.
2. Frontiero v Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (Ginsburg
briefed and argued as amicus, where local counsel-Joe
Levin, Morris Dees's partner at the Southern Poverty
Law Center-had agreed to allow Ginsburg to direct
the litigation in the Supreme Court, but later expressed
concern at Ginsburg's emphasis on heightened-scrutiny
rather than rational-basis review in the merits brief).
The complainants in Frontiero were Sharron Fron-
tiero, an Air Force officer, and her then husband, Joseph
Frontiero, a full-time college student. Sharron Frontiero
had been denied access to military housing and medical
benefits for her husband on the same terms that male of-
ficers had for their wives. While a male officer's spouse
was presumed dependent upon him for support, regard-
less of how much she earned, Sharron Frontiero had to
prove that her husband relied on her earnings for more
than one-half of his support in order to gain dependent
spouse benefits for him.
Eight Justices voted to strike down the sex-based
classification in Frontiero as unconstitutional. In writ-
ing for a plurality of four Justices, Justice Brennan
specifically cited the data Ginsburg set forth in her brief
on women's underrepresentation in politics as under-
scoring the need for heightened scrutiny of sex-based
classifications:
[W]omen are vastly under-represented in this
Nation's decisionmaking councils. There has
never been a female President, nor a female
member of this Court. Not a single woman
presently sits in the United States Senate, and
only 14 women hold seats in the House of Rep-
resentatives. And, as appellants point out, this
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underrepresentation is present throughout all
levels of our State and Federal Government.
411 U.S. at 686 n. 17 (citing Joint Reply Brief of Ap-
pellants and American Civil Liberties Union [amicus
curiae] at 9). Brennan proceeded to apply strict scrutiny
to the military benefit program's sex-based classifica-
tion, reasoning that sex-based classifications, like those
based on race, were inherently suspect because sex, like
race, was an immutable characteristic.
3. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Ginsburg briefed
as amicus).
Craig was most important for resolving years of un-
certainty as to the level of scrutiny with which sex-based
classifications would be reviewed. There, the Court ar-
ticulated a new intermediate scrutiny standard, located
between the traditional rational basis review and the
strict scrutiny accorded fundamental rights and race-
based classifications. Applying this standardto the facts
at issue in Craig, the Court struck down an Oklahoma
law setting a different legal age for purchasing 3.2




Kay, "Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Professor of Law," at 20.
1040ffice of the Solicitor General, "In re Harriet S.
Shapiro, Esq.: Petition for a Writ of Appreciation (2000)"
at 2.
105Shapiro's work with the Solicitor General's Office was
divided into roughly three periods. Her first decade was
spent drafting briefs and arguing cases. Her second was
engaged with drafting briefs, rather than arguing. In her
last decade, she assumed a variety of other tasks, includ-
ing screening cert petitions in criminal cases and respond-
ing to Freedom of Information Act requests. See "Petition
for a Writ of Appreciation for Harriet Shapiro," bestowed
upon Shapiro on the occasion of her retirement from the
Solicitor General's Office in 2001. The author thanks Beth
Brinkmann for bringing this petition to her attention.
10
6
Shapiro's seventeen argued cases included:
* Schlesinger v Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (Shapiro ar-
gued, but did not brief), holding not violative of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause a U.S. Navy regula-
tion that allowed up to thirteen years of commissioned
service to women before being mandatorily discharged
for failure to obtain promotion, while requiring men's
mandatory discharge upon being twice passed over for
promotion, even when fewer than thirteen years had
elapsed;
* Calfano v Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979) (Shapiro briefed
and argued on behalf of the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare as a party; joining Shapiro
on brief were two women-Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Barbara Babcock and Justice Department attorney
Susan Ehrlich-and a number of male colleagues),
holding not violative of the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause aprovision of the Social Security Act
that limited mothers' insurance benefits to widows
and divorced wives of male wage-earners, thereby ex-
cluding mothers of children born outside of marriage;
and
* Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v EEOC,
462 U.S. 669 (1983) (Shapiro briefed and argued on
behalf of The Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission as a party), holding violative of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act a limitation in a company's health-
insurance coverage of pregnancy-related costs for male
employees' spouses.
107Beth S. Brinkmann, "First Arguments at the Supreme
Court of the United States: A First Argument in the
Tradition of Many," 5 J. App. Prac. & Process 61
(2003).
'osLaFontant had been promoted to the rank of deputy
solicitor general by 1975. See, e.g., Schlesinger v Ballard,
419 U.S. 498 (1975).
10
9
Supreme Court A to Z, supra note 3, at 427.
110See, e.g., Kenneth Mack, "A Social History of Every-
day Practice: Sadie T. M. Alexander and the Incorporation
of Black Women into the Legal Profession, 1925-1960,"
87 Cornell L. Rev 1405, 1414-15 (2002). ("Until women
were admitted to the profession, courtrooms were battle-
fields where men engaged in forensic warfare in front of
all-male juries and judiciaries").
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